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Abstract
Increasing the diversity of political institutions is believed to improve the quality of political
discourse and, subsequently, the quality of political outcomes. Moreover, the presence of
diverse officials in positions of power signals the openness and fairness of political institu-
tions. These benefits of diversity should be particularly acute in the judiciary, where judges
are tasked with the symbolically and substantively powerful duty of interpreting and de-
fending constitutional values. Extant scholarship suggests that well-designed appointment
process can promote diversity without explicitly gendered goals, much less quotas. If correct,
these proposals raise the possibility of promoting greater diversity without having to resolve
politically charged debates about quotas. Yet, scholars disagree about the effects of partic-
ular design choices. Worse, estimating causal effects of institutions in observational data is
particularly difficult. We develop a research design linked to the empirical implications of
existing theoretical arguments to evaluate the effect of institutional change on the gender
diversity of peak courts cross-nationally. Specifically, we consider the effect of an increase
(or a decrease) in the number of actors involved in the appointment process. We find mixed
results for any existing claim about the role of appointment institutions play in increasing
diversity. Yet we also find that any institutional change seems to cause an increase in the
gender diversity of peak courts.
The world’s peak courts, by which we refer to high ordinary courts or constitutional courts,
are increasingly staffed by women (Hoekstra, 2010; Hoekstra, Kittilson and Bond, 2014;
Turquet, 2011). Within the last decade, gender parity or near parity has been reached on the
national high courts of Angola, Australia, Canada, Ecuador, Rwanda, Serbia, and Slovenia.
Women are increasingly serving as presidents of prestigious courts known internationally for
their innovative jurisprudence, including the Supreme Courts of Canada and Israel as well
as the Constitutional Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court. This pattern is notable
for a number of reasons. The presence of more women on peak courts may influence the law,
and by implication, core matters of public policy, either because women understand the law
in particular contexts or evaluate facts differently than men (e.g. Boyd, Epstein and Martin,
2010; Glynn and Sen, 2015; Collins, Manning and Carp, 2010) or becasue male judges behave
differently when they share the bench with women (Boyd, Epstein and Martin, 2010; Farhang
and Wawro, 2004). It is also possible that more diverse courts promote the legitimacy of
the justice system (e.g. O’Connor and Azzarelli, 2011; Kenney, 2013), and increased gender
diversity on important courts may be conceived of simply as an unalloyed normative good
(e.g. Malleson, 2003). Despite the trend toward diversification, as Figure 1 suggests, most
states are very far from gender parity.
Many of the potential causes of the underrepresentation of women on peak courts involve
deeply complicated sociocultural processes, including limited availability pools that follow
from gendered appointments to lower courts (Anleu and Mack, 2009; Epstein, Knight and
Martin, 2003), elite networks that fail to identify qualified candidates (Linehan, 2001), and
culturally structured role perceptions that make a prestigious judicial career simply easier
for men to pursue (Feenan, 2008; Kim, 2009). Yet some potential causes are far simpler.
Just as scholars interested in descriptive representation among members of parliament have
focused on the rules for selecting candidates, judicial scholars have focused on appointment
processes. This paper addresses whether particular institutional rules for appointment can
help diversify a peak court.
Arguments and findings about the effect of particular appointment institutions are varied.
Studies have suggested that executive appointment mechanisms promote greater diversity
on courts by ensuring clear accountability; clear accountability facilitates the imposition of
sanctions for homogenous selections and also allows for credit claiming for diverse selections
(Bratton and Spill, 2002; Williams and Thames, 2008; Valdini and Shortell, 2016). This
argument suggests that appointment mechanisms in which multiple actors play a role are
subject to coordination failures as one actor can blame another for a failure to diversify.
Thus the key is concentrating appointment power so that whatever pressure there is for
diversification can itself be concentrated.
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Figure 1: Gender Diversity on Hight Courts. Data from Turquet et al 2012.
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An alternative argument is that appointment mechanisms that assign multiple individu-
als to the appointment process are more effective for promoting diversity than are rules that
concentrate appointment power in a single office or individual (Gill, 2012). This argument
deemphasizes coordination failure and instead raises the possibility that appointment rules
impact the pools of candidates who are deemed qualified. Adding more actors to the process
should increase the chances of diversification by expanding pools of qualified applicants.1
Further, some scholars have questioned whether appointment institutions matter under all
conditions or even at all. In the U.S. case, Bratton and Spill (2002) find that executive ap-
pointment to state supreme court positions only promotes greater diversity when courts are
all-male. The difference they observe between executive appointment schemes and appoint-
ment via elections is insignificant once at least a single woman is on the bench. Hoekstra,
Kittilson and Bond (2014) suggest that the diversity of legislative bodies, rather than the
precise rules used for selecting judges, are the key to ensuring judicial diversity.2
Taken as a whole this literature has developed persuasive theoretical arguments linking
appointment processes to diversity outcomes, yet the empirical record is mixed. Even if
we wished to suggest an institutional form that promotes more gender diverse courts, the
empirical findings have yet to consistently favor one theoretical argument over another; and,
in light of the persuasiveness of the arguments, we are somewhat at a loss as to which
institutional form to recommend. In light of the normative issues at stake, we believe that it
is essential to seek credible answers to questions about the potential effects of appointment
institutions on a peak court’s gender diversity; however, as we do so it is important to keep
an open mind about the variety of theoretical arguments and research designs that might
inform the debate. We approach the problem in this paper in three ways.
Clarify Theoretical Claims It is appropriate to orient the study around existing argu-
ments; however, we believe that the arguments can be pushed further and integrated, the
result of which is to reveal new empirical implications and to highlight important concerns
of research design. Most importantly, a key feature of institutional research is that the rules
that structure political choice are typically linked to underlying political context, e.g., indi-
vidual preferences, group structure, culture, etc. (e.g., Neto and Cox, 1997; Riker, 1982).
1Still other scholars point to quotas or goals (A summary is found in Hoekstra, 2010). In her case for
gender quotas for the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, Malleson (2014) claims “The main argument
in favour of quotas is that, unlike all other methods, they are guaranteed to work.” Yet, Hoekstra (2010)
reminds us that an early attempt to ensure gender diversity on the Supreme Court of Ecuador via a quota
did not increase the proportion of female judges. Gender quota rules it would seem, like many rules, can
simply be ignored in some cases.
2Specifically, they argue that legislative gender quotas affect high court diversity by creating diverse
legislatures, which help push for greater diversity in justice institutions. The effect of quotas, mediated by
legislative gender diversity, is independent of the rules that are used for appointments.
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Drawing on the work of Bratton and Spill and Hoekstra, Kittlson and Bond, we develop
institutional models of appointments in which a state’s underlying pressure for institutional
diversification influences institutional effects. We will show theoretically that once under-
lying pressure for reform is incorporated into either of the main arguments scholars have
developed, institutional effects are strongest at moderate levels of pressure. In this sense, in-
stitutional effects are conditional. In addition, we will show that the effects of an institutional
change depend on the very institution that has been changed. In this sense, institutional
effects are path dependent. As we discuss below, these points not only increase the set
of empirical observations to observe, they have critical implications for research design by
structuring the very comparisons we should be making.
Strengthen Research Design We will develop an empirical design that will permit credi-
ble causal claims, which are linked to our formalizations of existing arguments. Leading stud-
ies in the field rely on cross-sectional designs and linear or logistic regression (e.g., Williams
and Thames, 2008; Bratton and Spill, 2002). Although these designs are potentially valid,
as Hoekstra (2010) and Hoekstra, Kittilson and Bond (2014) note, they rely on a number
of assumptions that may not hold in practice. The most obvious concern is whether the
designs control for measurable confounders. Even if they do, without balanced samples,
inference is heavily dependent on modeling choices. A deeper and related concern is that
differing adoption times for appointment systems greatly complicate attempts to control for
confounding. Consider the United States, which adopted its system in 1789: any control
variable measured after 1789 could potentially induce post-treatment bias with respect to
the United States. Generalizing this intuition to a global sample, any control variable mea-
sured recently could induce post-treatment bias with respect to many countries. In addition,
considerable differences in the sizes of peak courts complicates the use of an outcome variable
like the proportion of judges on a court who are women. Most obviously, a change from two
to three female judges means something considerably different on a five member court than
it does on a court with twenty judges or more. And even if we adopt the appealing norma-
tive position that courts should reflect the societies in which they are embedded, without
precise estimates of availability pools across all states and times, it is not clear exactly what
proportion of a court would reflect the optimal level of descriptive representation.3
Our design addresses these concerns in a number of ways. First we leverage changes in
constitutional processes for appointments to a state’s highest ordinary court or constitutional
court if one exists. To ensure that we are making sensible comparisons, we then exact match
3The exception here is when the availability pool is homogenous – such as before women were legally
allowed to attend law school or hold political posts. In these cases, the expected level of descriptive repre-
sentation of gender on courts would be no descriptive representation.
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each state that had a constitutional change to a state that did not. In exactly matching,
we ensure that states without changes had the same institutional framework as the state
that changed, in the year of the change. We then further match the sample with respect
to a number of pre-treatment confounders suggested by the literature. To ensure that we
can validly interpret changes in descriptive representation on peak courts, we focus on states
whose courts were entirely staffed by men at the time of the institutional change. We then
measure the time between the constitutional change and the year in which the first woman
was appointed. This design greatly clarifies the implicit comparisons that are made in the
typical regression approach. As we discuss below, it is also clearly linked to our theoretical
models. That said, what we gain in the clarity of research design we lose in sample size. To
address this issue we adopt a Rosenbaum (2002) randomization inference-based approach,
which allows for non-parametric inference in small samples. The approach has been used in
political science to evaluate the effects of electoral rules on opposition repression (Glynn and
Ichino, 2015) as well as the effect of ballot order on candidate success (Ho and Imai, 2008).
Identify multiple pathways forward It may be that institutional form influences diver-
sification in the way that one (but not the other) of the arguments we consider has identified.
Yet, it is also possible that the two arguments identify forces that are at play simultaneously
in any selection process. An increase in the number of actors playing a role in appointment
might at once raises the possibility of a coordination failure and expand searches for qual-
ified women judges. If this is true, then both arguments might be correct yet we would
not find evidence in a cross-national study of the kind we conduct. It is also possible that
the processes of appointment are captured by particular theoretical arguments well in some
states but not others. This may not be a matter of two states playing different equilibria in
the same game, but rather of two states operating under the rules of totally different games.
And finally, it is possible that neither argument captures well the effects of institutional
processes on diversification, either because informal institutional processes render the formal
processes ineffective (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004), or becasue selection rules simply do not
matter for gender diversity on courts.
Somewhat to our surprise, and yet reflecting the existing state of empirical scholarship,
our analysis suggests weak evidence in favor of each theoretical argument: an increase in the
number of actors involved in the selection process leads to slightly faster diversification but
a decrease in the number of actors also leads to slightly faster diversification. Interestingly,
when we look at all constitutional changes in the number of actors involved in judicial
selection – that is, changes that result in either an increase or a decrease in the number
of actors– we find strong evidence that treatment leads to more rapid diversification. This
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evidence undermines the idea that distinct forces are cancelling each out out and suggests
a theoretical mechanism which has yet to be identified. We summarize what that might
entail; however, rather than claiming that we have a unique theoretical model to explain the
mixed empirical findings, we simply point to what we believe a plausible explanation could
be and highlight how a truly integrated research agenda on this subject could answer the
question best. In all, we believe that our study suggests that need for a commitment to new
approaches to both theory and empirics, a topic we take up in the discussion section.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We first develop a theoretical frame-
work that formalizes existing arguments about the effects of appointment institutions found
in the literature. We then describe our research design, present our data, and summarize
our results. Finally, we consider what these results suggest about cross-national research on
appointment processes in the context of judicial diversification.
Linking Appointment Rules to Diversity Outcomes
Our goal in this section is to further develop two existing arguments that link judicial se-
lection institutions to diversity on the bench by (1) broadening the search for qualified
candidates or (2) reducing the possibility of coordination failure. We first discuss general
concerns that influence the construction of an institutional model of court diversification.
Then, we give a few examples of appointment processes for peak courts and place those pro-
cesses in the context of existing theoretical arguments. Next, we present two simple models
of appointments that attempt to capture the core logics of popular theoretical perspectives
on appointment institutions, while simultaneously linking those logics to underlying social
demand for greater diversity on the bench.
Assumptions about rules
We begin by recognizing that rules are not fully exogenous to political life. They are chosen,
typically purposively in order to resolve a social problem or manage a social phenomenon.
Contracts are awarded to the lowest bidder in order to combat corruption in procurements.
International agreements that lower tariffs and yet sanction particular measures to combat
unfair practices are designed to eliminate inefficient trade wars. Gender quotas are adopted
to increase the representation of women. As we move from theory to data, simply recognizing
this general point reminds us to ask about plausible processes of sample selection in the data
we observe. Yet, recognizing this feature of institutional analysis need not prevent us from
conceiving of particular institutions as exogenous for some purposes. Empirically, we may
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have a sensible theoretical account of how particular rules were assigned, and via that theory,
take a stab at addressing sample selection processes. Setting aside this empirical concern,
simply in order to think about the likely effects of rules on behavior, it will be quite helpful
to treat the rules as fixed, at least temporarily. Similarly, because conditions change over
time, some rules may come to be viewed as exogenous as an empirical matter, even if they
were quite purposefully chosen (Carey, 2000). The bottom line is that we will proceed
theoretically by first treating appointment rules as exogenous, even though we acknowledge
that the rules may be chosen in order to ensure particular kinds of appointments, potentially
by the same people who are doing the appointing.
A second baseline assumption is that the types of institutions we have in mind are
best thought of as “processes,” which channel individual or group interests into particular
outcomes. This conception has two implications. First, appointment processes vary con-
siderably around the world (Gill, 2012). Every theoretical statement about appointments
of which we are aware ignores or obscures some element of the process in order to get the-
oretical traction. We will want to consider whether the elements of the process that have
been set aside are important. At the very least, we should recall that our findings should
be understood in the context of less than general model. Second, we should expect insti-
tutions to function differently in different places because the underlying interests that they
channel vary across context. A well-known example from the study of electoral institutions
makes the point. Single-member district plurality (SMDP) rules should cause greater coor-
dination among elites and in the electorate relative to multi-member district proportional
representation rules (MMPR); however, SMDP’s effect on coordination depends on under-
lying sociopolitical structure (Clark and Golder, 2006). In states with a high number of
salient political cleavages, SMDP ought to have a powerful reductive effect on the number
of candidates/parties. In states where underlying features of society have already reduced
the dimensionality of political conflict, rules that incentivize coordination will have weaker
(perhaps no) effects. Judicial institutions ought to exhibit this feature as well. Importantly,
we see this idea at work in the Bratton and Spill study. They argue that the effectiveness
of executive appointment rules for increasing gender diversity on state supreme courts turns
on a court’s existing diversity. The theoretical rationale is that elections are relatively low
information environments. As a consequence, voters generally are unlikely to have consid-
erable information about existing gender imbalances on their high courts. Governors, in
contrast, will surely be aware of this fact. In the context of an all-male court, governors are
likely to receive considerable pressure to appoint a woman. This pressure ought to be lower
once a court has been diversified. Thus, the difference between appointment rules should be
particularly important for appointment choices to all-male courts (Bratton and Spill, 2002,
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pp. 507-508). Generalizing this point, the effect of particular appointment rules are likely
to depend on existing sociopolitical pressure for diversity in political institutions.
Key Elements of the Appointments Process in Prior Work
Institutional scholarship on gender and peak courts has focused on three aspects of the
process – the identification of qualified candidates, the nomination of particular individu-
als and the decision to assign an individual to a particular seat. Over the past four years,
our research team, associated with the Varieties of Democracy Project (V-Dem), has been
collecting information on appointment and removal institutions for peak courts. Working
in cooperation with the Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton,
2012), we are developing descriptions of the appointment and removal institutions for peak
courts in all states (and many former colonies), from 1900 to the present. Constitutionally
defined procedures largely, though not always, focus on two stages. Formally, the identifi-
cation of candidates as well the development of particular proposals takes place via what
we will refer to as the “nominations stage” (For a careful discussion of the aspects of the
appointment process, see Gill, 2012), where a legally empowered actor proposes a name for a
seat. The second stage, what we will refer to as the “appointments stage” involves a legally
empowered actor assigning a proposed name to a seat.
In practice, these two stages can be combined in a variety of ways. Figure 2 describes
four distinct constitutional processes for appointing constitutional court judges. The Pe-
ruvian process, depicted at the bottom-left of the figure, is clearly the most simple. The
Constitution of Peru creates a process in which nomination and appointment are assigned
to the same institutional actor, the Peruvian Republic’s Congress. The process for selecting
Federal Constitutional Court judges in Germany is marginally more complex, in that the
upper and lower chapters of the German parliament are empowered to select one half of
the judges who sit on the Federal Constitutional Court. As in Peru, within the chambers,
nominating and appointing authority are combined. Both of these processes contrast with
that used to appoint members of the Mexican Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court
of Serbia in that the nominations and appointments stages are assigned to distinct actors.
Mexico’s process involves presidential nomination followed by appointment by the Senate
for each of the Court’s eleven justices. The Serbian process both separates the nominations
and appointments stages and assign powers to multiple actors. Specifically, five judges are
appointed via one one of the following three processes: (1) the National Assembly nominates
and the President appoints, (2) the President nominates and the National Assembly ap-
points, and (3) the High Court and Prosecutor’s Council nominates and the Supreme Court
8
of Cassation appoints.
Figure 2: Constitutional processes for appointing constitutional court judges in Serbia, Ger-
many, Mexico and Peru. To allow a comparison to Figure 2, the processes described in the
figure reflect those in practice in 2011.
Scholars who value group appointment processes highlight the positive effects on the
identification of qualified women that follows from tapping into a more varied and dense
network of contacts (Gill, 2012). The Serbian process reflects well the kind of procedure
that we might envision under this approach. Not only does final appointment power reside
with multiple institutional actors (and many individual people), so does the nomination
stage as well. Scholars who see the potential for coordination failure among larger groups of
decision-makers envision rules that concentrate power in a small set of actors. Under this
approach Mexico’s presidential system reflects a natural process, yet the German approach
is similar in so far as blame can be placed on two institutional actors. In principle, the
Peruvian system is the most concentrated mechanism for appointment and thus the most
likely to produce diversity if coordination is the problem.4 In practice, women constitute
over a majority of the members of the Constitutional Court of Serbia. The German Federal
Constitutional Court is roughly one-third female as is twenty percent of the Supreme Court
of Mexico. The Constitutional Tribunal of Peru has one woman. This very small sample
indicates support of the notion that more actors should promote diversification. Whether
this pattern should hold and under what conditions is the subject to which we now turn.
4Note: There is a complication here in so far as the fragmentation of a legislature (and obvious concern
in Peru) might render the Peruvian process less concentrated.
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Modeling appointments for gender diversity
The empirical implications of existing arguments seem clear, but we believe that there are
important reasons to formalize their logics. As we will show, these logics suggest a larger,
more nuanced set of implications than have been heretofore recognized, and which raise
important challenges for standard approaches to inference. Our particular aim then is to
develop the logic of existing arguments when underlying sociopolitical features of a state are
incorporated, which for simplification we will refer to as “pressure” for a diverse bench. Of
course, this might be done in a variety of ways, via a variety of classes of models. Prior to
developing the models, we address some general modeling concerns.
Classes of Models
Reducing appointment processes to one of two types (where a single person or institutional
actor can be identified or not) greatly simplifies both theoretical and empirical analyses, but
we should remember that much about existing processes has, in fact, been obscured for this
benefit. First, suppose that we wish compare to compare presidential systems to all others. It
is not entirely clear why the Mexican presidential system concentrates accountability more
than the Peruvian system. Indeed, since both processes involve a legislative chamber, if
anything, the Mexican system has a more diffuse form of accountability. Second, it is not
clear why we should treat the Mexican and German systems as if they were identical to the
Serbian process. Our approach will be to simply count up the actors who are involved.
Another consideration is that even within a particular institutional structure there can be
considerable variation, and even just with respect to the formal rules. Consider the Mexican
case in relation to another familiar process, that run in the United States. Both cases are
considered forms of presidential appointment; however, they are different in a number of
ways. The U.S. President nominates a single candidate. The Mexican President delivers to
the Senate a slate of three nominees. In so far as a larger slate allows for a more diverse
group of candidates, this difference may be quite important to the chances of appointment
a female judge. Other differences might matter, as well. Whereas the U.S. President can
always send the Senate another candidate independently of the number of times that the
Senate has rejected a nominee, the Mexican President is empowered to select independently
after the Senate has rejected two slates.5 If scholars are correct in their view that presidents
have particularly strong incentives to appointment women (Williams and Thames, 2008),
then the Mexican system, by advantaging the president, should be viewed as representing a
more diversity-enhancing process.
5Art´ıculo 96, Constitucio´n Pol´ıtica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos.
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Of course, this entire line of reasoning suggests that we might view appointment processes
for the purpose of enhancing diversity as appointment processes are generally conceived – as
bargaining interactions (e.g. Moraski and Shipan, 1999). But what kind of bargaining model
exactly? Without an explicit statement of the process, it is not clear what to conclude
about the bargaining leverage of one party relative to another. Further, it is not clear
that a bargaining framework is necessary or useful. Depending on what we believe about
the differences between women and men in particular contexts, conceiving of the process
differently may be useful.
Most importantly, existing arguments do not seem to envision a bargaining setting.
Rather the focus is either on the ways that rules change the possibility for holding offi-
cials accountable or on the ways that rules incentivize more creative searchers for qualified
judges. Scholars who highlight the advantages of group selection seem to have in mind a
process that taps into independent and diverse information networks. The basic idea is that
by involving more entities in the search and appointment process, the information network
expands, which increases the chances of a successful search for diversity. In contrast, schol-
ars who see group processes as potentially problematic seem to have in mind a coordination
problem that can emerge when choices are interdependent. Rather than a bargaining prob-
lem, scholars of gender diversity seem to have in mind something closer to a public goods
provision problem, where the good being supplied is greater gender diversity on a peak court.
The key difference is whether choices are independent or interdependent. Our approach will
be to develop a model in which choices are modeled as independent and then to model a
process in which choices are interdependent. We do so by proposing a simple probability
model and then a simple game theoretic model of public goods provision.
Two Models
We begin by assuming that an appointment processes can be described by an integer, n ≥
1, which represents the number of individuals empowered to appointment a judge to a
court. Each individual chooses from the set G = {M,F}.6 A slate of appointed judges is
characterized by a list l = {g1, g2, . . . , gn} of judge genders gi ∈ G for selectors 1, . . . , n. We
will say first that an appointment process is considered a success if at least one member of l is
F . We then relax the assumption of what constitutes success.7 Finally, we will assume that
there is pressure in society for the appointment of a woman, which we will denote v ∈ (0, 1),
6We thus collapse the nominations and appointments stages. Conceptually, we view this choice as similar
to assuming that selectors play an important role in the identification of quality candidates.
7Note: We have completed the analysis with respect to the first model. We are still working on completing
the game theoretical account, as there are a number of difficult conceptual choices that have proved vexing
so far.
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and where values of v closer to 1 indicate stronger pressure for a female appointment.
In order to model the dynamic envisioned by models that privilege a larger number of
appointers, we consider a process in which appointer choices are independent of each other.
To model the dynamic envisioned by models that privilege a smaller number of appointers,
we consider a process in which these choices are interdependent.
Independent Appointments
Consider a simple probability model of choice, designed to avoid concerns for a variety of
group dynamics that motivate scholars who prefer individual appointment rules. Suppose
that the choices of the selectors are linked to underlying pressure for diversity. Specifically,
let the probability selector i sets gi = F be v, so that selectors are increasingly likely to
choose a female judge as pressure for diversity increases. The number of female judges
appointed via this process is thus a random variable with distribution B(n, v), so that the
probability of k women being selected in an appointment process is given by(
n
k
)
vk(1− v)n−k.
Given our definition of success, we are interested in the probability of at least one woman
being appointed in a search. This probability is
1−
(
n
0
)
v0(1− v)n = 1− (1− v)n.
Importantly (and transparently) the probability of success increases monotonically in n.
This very simple model clearly captures the basic logic of the argument that adding additional
selectors to the process increases the probability of a successful search. Indeed, as the number
of selectors increases without bound, the probability of success approaches 1. But the model
does more. It clarifies one way in which rules might interact with underlying pressure for
diversity. At very high demand, where every selector is likely to identify and appoint a
qualified woman, adding selectors has a very small impact at the margin. Substantively,
there is such high pressure for diversity in this setting that even a single selector would have
ample incentives, information and opportunities to ensure a successful search. For a similar
reason, where demand is very low, adding an additional selector, while certainly increasing
the probability of a successful search, will have a relatively low impact. There simply are
too many ways to fail to identify a qualified female candidate when pressure is too low. It is
at moderate levels of pressure where institutional form should make a meaningful difference.
Table 1 shows a few examples for values of demand reflecting low, middle and high levels,
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which summarize the following proposition.
Pressure (v) One Selector Three Selectors Four Selectors max(4 Pr(Success))
.02 .02 .04 .07 .05
.50 .50 .875 .94 .44
.98 .98 ≈ 1.0 ≈ 1.0 .02
Table 1: Probability of a success with increases in the number of selectors, given sociopolitical
demand (v) for diversity. Column 1 shows the level of sociopolitical pressure for an increase
in diversity. Columns 2 through 4 show probabilities of success for selectors n = 1, . . . , 4.
Column 5 shows the difference in probability of success for four selectors vs. one.
Proposition 1. The probability that a court has at least one woman judge is increasing
in the number of appointers, but the effect is strongest at moderate values of demand for
diversity, relative to low or high values.
Interdependent Appointments
We now consider a simple game theoretic model of the appointment process, which we
believe reflects the basic concern of scholars who have promoted the executive appointment
mechanism. The intuition we wish to capture is that pressure for adding gender diversity
will be reduced as we increase the number of appointers, permitting each appointer to rely
on the others. The simplest form of it we can identify is a textbook public goods provision
game, which is elaborated by Osborne (2003) among others. We model this process as
an n ≥ 2 player public goods provision game, in which each player benefits identically
from a successful search. Let the utility value of success be v, so that the value increases
in underlying sociopolitical pressure for diversity.8 We also assume that each appointer
confronts a personal (but identical) opportunity cost, c ∈ (0, 1), for selecting the female
candidate. This cost might be very small, as when the female candidate under consideration
is strongly preferred to the male alternative, for reasons unrelated to gender. The cost might
be relatively large when the opposite is true. A pure Nash equilibrium in this game is a
8Note, all appointers obtain v if there is a success. An alternative model might consider scenarios in
which appointers are only rewarded for personally increasing diversity. If this is the model though, it is hard
to see the value of considering a group choice.
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list l of n judge choices. For sufficiently high demand for diversity, i.e., v ≥ c, there are n
lists that are equilibria in this game. Each list involves a single appointer choosing gi = F ,
where all other appointers choose M . In contrast, if v < c there is only one equilibrium in
which all gi = M . In both cases, the institutional form has no effect on outcomes – either
the diversity search will be successful or it will not be successful, but this all depends on
society’s demand for diversity, in a sense reflecting the essential logic of Hoekstra, Kittilson
and Bond (2014).
This version of the model, of course, fails to capture the underlying intuition of concen-
trating appointment power on a single person. Scholars must have a different dynamic in
mind. Consider the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this game, where each
appointer appoints a female candidate with probability pi. An mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium in this game is a list of n probability distributions over G, such that that pi = pj for
all players i and j.9
For this to be an equilibrium with all pi ∈ (0, 1), we first require v ≥ c, as before. If
this does not hold, all players will set p = 0. Assuming that this condition holds, it must
be that each appointer is indifferent between appointing a female and a male judge. If this
condition does not hold, given the symmetry of strategies, then either all appointers choose
a male or a single appointer will choose a woman, while all others choose a male; and, thus,
the institutions we use will be irrelevant. Recognizing that the utility value of appointing a
woman is v − c, for equilibrium we require for all players that
9In this case, i.e., where strategies are symmetric, we are assuming that every appointer picks an identical
distribution, i.e., each appointer chooses the same probability of appointment a female judge.
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v − c = v · Pr(at least one other appointer chooses a woman) (1)
v − c = v · (1− (1− p)n−1) (2)
c
v
= (1− p)n−1 (3)
p? = 1− ( c
v
)
1
n−1 . (4)
There are three points to make. First, note that as n increases without bound, the
probability with which each appointer selects a woman approaches 0. Adding appointers
incentivizes each appointer to more significantly rely on the other appointers in order to
to solve the group goal. Second, Equation 3 indicates that in equilibrium, the probability
that all the other n− 1 appointers fail to select a woman is independent of n. Instead, this
probability simply reflects the ratio of the opportunity costs to the group value of adding
diversity. When demand is high, the probability of this kind of failure is very low; when
demand is low, the chance of a failure of this type increases up to the point where it is certain
to happen (i.e., when v falls below c). The key consequence of this independence is that
the probability of appointing at least one woman in this process falls monotonically with n.
This probability is
1− (1− p?)( c
v
). (5)
As the essential logic of the scholars who value single appointer processes suggest, coordina-
tion failures get worse as the number of appointers increase.
Third, and we think most importantly, the negative effect of adding appointers on the
probability of a successful appointment process depends on demand for diversity. For very
large v, note that the last term of (5) approaches zero. Thus, independently of the effect
of n on the probability of one appointer’s choice, the total probability of a successful search
will approach 1. Likewise, as v approaches c, the second and third terms will approach 1, no
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matter the value of n, so that the probability of appointing at least one woman approaches
zero. With n ≥ 2, it is at moderate values of demand where the institutional effects should
be strongest.
Finally, consider what would happen if there were only one appointer, i.e. n = 1. In this
case, everything depends on the value of v relative to c. For very high v, gender diversity
will increase with certainty. For low v, gender diversity will not be increased.
What does this mean with respect to varying numbers of appointers? When v is very low,
both a single appointer process and a multiple appointer process will fail to appoint a woman.
For sufficiently large v, the single appointer system will produce greater diversity whereas the
multiple appointer system may fail. The probability of increasing diversity is never higher
with multiple appointers, and in so far as it is lower, the difference increases as appointers
are added. The extent to which this difference increases depends on the underlying pressure
for diversity. When this pressure is either relatively low (but sufficient high to afford any
incentive for diversity) or relatively high, the increase in appointers has a relatively weak
effect. When the pressure is moderate, the effect is strong.
Proposition 2. For low pressure for diversity, adding appointers to an appointment process
has no effect on the probability of having at least one woman on a court. For sufficiently high
levels of pressure, adding appointers (weakly) decreases the probability of having at least one
woman. Assuming that pressure is sufficient to increase diversity at all, the effect of adding
appointers is strongest at moderate levels of demand, relative to either low or high demand.
Summary
This section suggests a number of implications that follow from formalizing existing argu-
ments. First, whether you conceive of the process as involving essentially independent or
inter-dependent choices, the effect of adding an additional actor to the process depends on
social pressure for an increase in diversity. Figure 3 summarizes these results graphically.
The top panel plots the change in probability of at least one female judge being appointed
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associated with a single appointer increase to the process,10 as a function of pressure for
diversity (v). The bottom panel shows the same results for the model in which choices are
interdependent. These functions are different in a few obvious ways. First, the effects in
the top panel are all non-negative whereas they are all non-positive in the bottom panel.
And of course the shapes are clearly different. Notably, the discontinuity in the bottom
panel reflects difference in the probability of a successful search at relatively low pressure
but where a single appointer would surely appoint a woman. In that case, simply adding
a single appointer implies that you will surely not appoint a woman. More importantly,
both panels indicate that the largest effects (positive or negative) are at moderate levels of
pressure.
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Figure 3: Shows the change in the probability of at least one female judge being appointed
associated with a single appointer increase, across the complete range of pressure for diversity
(v). The top panel shows results for the independent appointments model. The bottom panel
shows results for the interdependent appointments model. Both cases show the results for a
change from one appointer to two.
A final point of comparison between the models in described by Figure 4, which shows
10Specifically, we plot Pr(k ≥ 1|n = 2)−Pr(k ≥ 1|n = 1), where k is the number of women appointed in
a process and n is the number of apponters.
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Figure 4: Shows the change in the probability of at least one female judge being appointed
associated with a single appointer increase, for different numbers of appointers prior to the
change. Specifically, then we consider effects associated with one appointer increases using 1,
. . . , 5 as the baseline number of appointers. The left panel shows results for the independent
appointments model. The right panel shows results for the interdependent appointments
model.
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changes in the probability of appointing a woman associated with a one appointer increase
in the process, for all institutional processes prior to the change. The left panel shows these
effects for the independent choice model; the right panel shows the same effects for the inter-
dependent choices panel. The key point is that while changes in the effects of an increase in
each model are monotonic, they are decreasing. The biggest effects are for changes in very
small appointment groups. Considering the left panel, the figure suggests that the change
in the probability of success is nearly 0.25 when a one appointer process is changed to a
two appointer process. This effect drops all the way to 0.10 when we consider the effect of
changing from a two appointer process to a three appointer process. This heterogeneity will
guide our empirical approach.
Research Design
Our research design combines pair matching and Fisherian randomization inference for
matched pairs. The procedure involves the following steps.
1. Identify states that have had changes in their constitutional terms defining the process
for appointment to a peak court. We refer to these states as treatment states.
2. Exactly match each treatment state to potential control states using pre-treatment
institutional information, year of constitutional change, and the number of women on
the court prior to treatment. This results in a set of plausible control states for each
treatment state.
3. Use propensity score matching to identify pairs of treatment and control states on the
basis of plausible pre-treatment confounders.
4. For the set of states that survive this procedure, calculate a signed-rank statistic.
5. Compare this statistic to the permutation distribution of signed-rank statistics derived
from our sample. The null hypothesis is that treatment assignment within pairs of
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states is independent of the outcomes.
Treatment
To explore the empirical implications of the models we exploit reforms to constitutions that
changed the structure guiding appointments to a state’s peak court. Again, we focus on the
state’s highest ordinary court (typically but not always referred to as a “Supreme Court”) or
a constitutional court if one exists. Using text provided by the Comparative Constitutions
Project (CCP), we have diagramed the appointment processes for all states included in
the CCP dataset from 1900 to the present. In so far as we are coding each constitutional
event over time, we are able to identify when and how the appointment processes for peak
court judges changes.11 We begin by considering the effect of an increase in the number of
nominators or appointers carried out between the years 1970 and 2000. For states that had
more than one change in this process, we only use the first change, treating any subsequent
changes in the institutional rules as post-treatment. Figure 5 illustrates this coding rule.
The Constitution of Nicaragua was reformed in 1987 as a part of the institutionalization of
the Sandanista regime. A part of the reform included a change in the appointment process
for the Supreme Court. Like modern day Peru, Supreme Court justices were nominated and
appointed by the National Assembly from 1962 through 1986. The 1987 reform assigned
nomination power to the President leaving appointment power in the National Assembly.
We code this as an increase from one actor in the appointment process to two actors and
thus treat Nicaragua in 1987 as a treatment observation.
11The limited exception is for a small set of countries for which CCP did not have a constitution and
where our research team was unable to translate it. For constitutions not yet translated, we have only
been able to identify changes in the constitutions written in languages our coding team can read: English,
Spanish, French, Portuguese, Dutch, Polish, Russian, Romanian, German, Finnish and Norwegian.
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Figure 5: Illustrates nominations and appointments process for the Supreme Court justices in
Nicaragua. The process involved a single actor, the National Assembly, from 1962 to 1982.
In 1987 the Constitution was reformed and assigned the nomination power to the President,
leaving the appointment power in the National Assembly.
Matching
Our interest is in making causal inferences about the effect of this treatment on a set of
states that have changed their constitutional processes for appointing peak court judges and
a comparable set of states that did not experience such a change. We proceed in light of our
theoretical arguments. These arguments indicate that the effects of a change in institutional
form depend on not only the pre-treatment level of political pressure for gender diversification
but on the existing institutional framework prior to the change. In addition, we have defined
success as appointing at least one women. Empirically, it is not clear whether we should treat
a change from four women to five women on a seven member court as a success. To ensure
that we can validly interpret a change in the number of women on a court as successful with
respect to gender diversification, it is appropriate to focus on courts that had no women
at the time of the institutional change. We thus match every treatment state to a state
that had the same number of nominators and appointers in the year that treatment state’s
institutions changed. We also ensure that all states in the study had yet to have a woman
appointed to their peak court at the time of treatment. We conduct this exact matching in
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the CEM package in R (Iacus, King and Porro, 2009).
Within the set of exactly matched states, we then use propensity score matching in the
package Optmatch to generate matched pairs (Hansen and Klopfer, 2006). Because the
effect of institutional changes on court gender diversity is conditioned by the existing social
pressure for diversity, we include several potential confounding variables in the analysis. First
and foremost, we include the percent women in the lower house of a country’s legislature or
parliament.12 As Hoekstra, Kittilson and Bond (2014) find, there is a relationship between
the level of gender diversity in the legislative branch and subsequent gender diversity on high
courts. It is possible that both the level of gender diversity in legislative office and on high
courts is shaped by outside social forces, but there is some evidence that the presence of
women in legislative office might lead to increased presence of women on courts (Hoekstra,
Kittilson and Bond, 2014): the presence of women in legislative office can serve as a signal to
judicial selectors that women are already involved in the political process and that citizens
value gender diversity in office.
We also seek to condition on the amount of time since universal suffrage was granted
for each country (also from Paxton, Green and Hughes (2008)). We expect that the longer
women have had access to political power through voting, the pressure for increased access
to institutional positions of power for women will also be greater. To capture a broader set
of features that are associated with social pressure to diversify, we also include a Women’s
Political Empowerment Index from the Varieties of Democracy project. This index was
created through point estimates of a Bayesian factor analysis model of several variables:
women’s participation in civil society participation, percent female journalists, freedom of
domestic movement for women, freedom of discussion for women, freedom from forced labor
for women, property rights for women, access to justice for women, and power distributed
12Data are from the InterParliamentary Union, but we used versions collected by (Paxton, Green and
Hughes, 2008) for years 1970-2003 and (Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments, N.d.)
for years 2003-2010. Missing data between two observed data points were filled in with liner interpolation.
In addition, if there were no women in legislative office, preceding missing values were filled in, likewise, as
zeros.
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by gender (Coppedge et al., 2015). All of these measures should be associated with an
underlying social pressure for or preference for gender diversity on peak courts.
In addition to the Female Empowerment Index, we include several additional indices
and measures from the Varieties of Democracy Project. The Egalitarian Democracy Index
measures the extent to which the ideal of egalitarian democracy– that is, the extent to
which there is an equal distribution of political power across social groups such as class,
sex, religion, and ethnicity–is achieved in a given country year. Similarly, the Participatory
Democracy Index measures the extent to which all citizens can be active in the political
process.
Other included control variables from the Varieties of Democracy Project are a measure
of court packing; a measure of the extent to which women have access to justice; a measure
for whether and the extent to which power is distributed by gender; a measure of women’s
civil society participation; a measure of the presence of female journalists; a measure of the
freedom of domestic movement for women; a measure of the freedom of discussion for women;
a measure of the extent to which women are free from forced labor; and a measure of the
extent of property rights for women. Table 2 lists these variables and summary statistics for
the full, unmatched data set.13
Matching Consequenes Figure 6 helps evaluate the consequences of matching. It shows
the standardized differences in means across treated and control countries for the unmatched
data and for matched samples. The open circles indicate standardized differences in means
(control means subtracted from treatment means divided by pooled variance) for the un-
matched sample. The black points show the same information for the matched sampled
data. As expected, exact matching on the number of nominators and appointers as well
as the year produces perfect balance. Although there was good balance in the unmatched
sample with respect to the number of appointers, treated states had far fewer nominators
on average. Thus, the unmatched sample would not permit valid comparisons. Although
13We used linear interpolation to fill in any missing values in years between observed data points.
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Variable Name Mean St.Dev. Range
Year 1991 15.55 1960, 2015
Number of Nominators 0.55 0.96 0, 9
Number of Appointers 1.26 0.79 1, 6
Percent Women Lower House 11 9.87 0, 63.8
Years since Univ. Suffrage 41.81 23.5 0, 122
Court Packing Index 0 1.09 -4.21, 3.46
Freedom of Discussion for Women 0.5 1.62 -3.55, 3.87
Property Rights for Women 0.81 1.33 -3.74, 2.93
Women’s Civil Soc. Participation 0.71 1.16 -3.06, 3.24
Power Distributed by Gender 0 1.12 -2.98, 4.2
Women Political Empowerment 0.58 0.22 .09, .96
Egalitarian Democracy 0.36 0.26 .02, .92
Access to Justice for Women 0.46 1.47 -3.83, 3.55
Freedom Domestic Mvmt for Women 0.97 1.33 -4.52, 3.53
Freedom from Forced Labor for Women 0.81 1.08 -3.94, 2.81
Female Journalists 28.9 13.68 1.75, 66.72
Participatory Democracy Index 0.29 0.22 0.01, 0.84
Table 2: This table shows summary data for the full, unmatched data set. Treated countries
are matched exactly on Year, Number of Nominators, and Number of Selectors. Then within
exact match subclass, treated countries are matched to one control country with propensity
score matching on the other variables.
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balance is not perfect for the remaining variables, it is significantly improved for the most
significant potential confounder, the percent women in the lower house of the legislature.
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Figure 6: Displays the standardized difference of means for treated and control units in the
original and matched samples.
Matching ensures that we are making sensible comparisons in our analysis, comparisons
that are interpretable in light of existing theoretical logics. Yet, there are costs of ensuring
valid comparisons. Specifically, the costs lie in a reduced sample size. Table 3 provides a
summary of the consequences of our matching approach. The first column of the table shows
the set of state years in which there was an increase in either the nominators or appointers in
a selection process for peak courts. The second column displays the set of control states for
each treatment state that satisfied the criteria for inclusion in our study, most importantly
the criterion that there had not been a woman appointed to the court in the year of the
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constitutional change.14 The third column of the table shows the set of states that had a
constitutional reduction in the number of nominators or appointers, as well as the matches
for those states. The key point here is that there are at most 15 pairs of states for any
analysis. Figures 7 and 8 place the treated and control units on global maps. Figure 9 shows
all treated and control units if we define treatment as a change in any direction, a choice we
will return to below. As Table 3 highlights treated units largely come from the developing
world, where constitutions have been subject to considerable change.
Analysis: Treatment is an Increase in Actors
After matching we are left with a sample of pairs of states. Recall that the outcome of interest
is the time in years from institutional change until the appointment of the first woman to
the court of interest. We are interested in whether treatment increases this time; however
we are especially interested in the effect for moderate levels of pressure for diversification.
Following Hoekstra, Kittilson and Bond (2014) we use the percentage of women in the lower
chamber of a state’s legislature to measure this pressure. To focus on states with moderate
degrees of pressure, where we should see the strongest effects, we subset the data to states
that fall within the second and third quartiles of the distribution of percentage women in
the lower chamber.
To conduct our analysis, we first calculate a signed-rank statistic for each sample. For
each pair of states, we know the number of years from treatment until the first woman
appointment. The signed-rank statistic uses the sign of the difference between the time in
treatment and the time in control, as well as the rank of these differences. We use the
statistic as calculated in Glynn and Ichino (2015). In this approach, the statistic is the sum
of the ranks (of the differences in time to first appointment) for all pairs such that that
treated state experienced a woman appointed to the peak court first. Under this approach, a
statistic of 0 would indicate that the control state experienced the appointment of a woman
14And additional criterion is that we have data for the outcomes for each member of each pair.
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Treated: Increase Treated: Decrease
Treated Control Treated Control
Albania, 1976 Japan Albania, 1991 Paraguay
Cntl Afr. Rep., 1994 Mozambique Benin, 1970 Liberia
Chad, 1989 Suriname Burundi, 1992 Bahamas
Chile, 1980 Tunisia Nigeria, 1978 Algeria
Ecuador, 1983 Guyana Suriname, 1982 South Korea
Kazakhstan, 1995 Croatia Belgium, 1998
Lithuania, 1992 Myanmar Bolivia, 1994
Madagascar, 1975 France Cambodia, 1976
Mauritania, 1991 Estonia Cameroon, 1975
Nicaragua, 1987 St. Lucia Cape Verde, 1999
Niger, 1999 Myanmar Chad, 1996
Romania, 1991 Dominican Rep. Colombia, 1979
Seychelles, 1993 Suriname Comoros, 1996
Togo, 1992 Croatia Congo, 1973
Uruguay, 1977 Ireland Cuba, 1976
Zambia*, 1996 Uganda D. R. Congo, 1978
Algeria, 1989 Ecuador, 1995
Angola, 1992 Equatorial Guinea, 1973
Belarus, 1996 German Dem. Rep., 1974
Benin, 1984 Ghana, 1982
Bulgaria, 1991 Guatemala, 1993
Burkina Faso, 1997 Guinea, 1990
Cambodia, 1972 Morocco, 1970
Cape Verde, 1992 Sao Tome & Prin., 1990
Colombia, 1991 Spain, 1978
Congo, 1992 Uruguay, 1985
El Salvador, 1994
Eqt. Guinea, 1991
Ethiopia, 1987
Fiji, 1997
Georgia, 1995
Ghana, 1979
Guatemala, 1985
Haiti, 1987
Honduras, 1991
Mali, 1992
Mongolia, 1992
Morocco, 1996
Nigeria, 1978
Poland, 1989
Portugal, 1989
Russia, 1991
Sao Tome and Principe, 1982
South Africa, 1993
Thailand, 1997
Turkey, 1982
Venezuela, 1999
Table 3: Shows all treated and matched control states. The first column lists all states that had an increase
in the actors involved in the state’s appointment process. The third column lists the states that experienced
a decrease in the number of actors. Columns two and four show matches for each treatment state that
survived the rules for inclusion in the study and had data available for the outcome.
∗ Zambia and its pair, Uganda, drop out of the analysis because they “tie.” That is, they have the same
number of years from treatment to the first woman on the court, so do not provide information for the
sign-rank test.
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Treated as Increase
Control Treated
Figure 7: Displays treated and control states for an increase in the constitutional rules for
nomination and appointment to a state’s peak court.
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Treated as Decrease
Control Treated
Figure 8: Displays treated and control states for an increase in the constitutional rules for
nomination and appointment to a state’s peak court.
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Treated as All Changes
Control Treated
Figure 9: Displays treated and control states for a treatment defined as either an increase
or a decrease in the constitutional rules for nomination and appointment to a state’s peak
court.
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first for every pair. Results that are further from 0 are consistent with outcomes in which
a larger number of treated states experienced the appointment of a woman first. Table 4
shows the number of pairs, p-values for each test, average years to the first woman appointee
and the proportion of pairs for which the treatment observation had the first appointment
for every analysis we report.
For causal inference, the key assumption in this design is that conditional on matching
the probability of assignment to each treatment condition is equal. However, given the rel-
atively small sample size we might be concerned that any observable difference is simply
do to change. To address this possibility, we adopt a Fisherian randomization approach to
inference. Under this approach, the reference distribution for the statistic we calculate is
constructed from our sample by permuting treatment assignments. If the null hypothesis is
that treatment assignment is independent of outcomes then by permuting each treatment
assignment within all pairs and then calculating the signed-rank statistic for each permuta-
tion, we construct a distribution against which we can compare our result. For our smallest
sample size of five pairs, there are 25 or 32 possible permutations of the treatment assign-
ments. For our largest sample size of 22 pairs, there are over 4,000,000 possible permutations
of the data.
Figure 10 shows the results of this procedure. The one-tailed p-value is 0.38 for the full
sample of states; however, it is 0.125 in the sample that focuses on cases where the measure
of percentage women in the lower chamber of legislature suggests moderate pressure for
institutional diversification – precisely where we are supposed to observe the largest effect. A
person committed to the theoretical proposition that more actors should cause diversification
might be encouraged by this result, especially recognizing that the sample is still rather small
(there are only 8 pairs in the moderate pressure sample). On the other hand, a fair reading
of the results, especially one recognizing that a one-tailed test is likely inappropriate here,
would be naturally skeptical of the finding.
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Figure 10: Shows permutation distributions for the signed-rank statistic associated with each
sample. The plot on the left shows the analysis for the full sample of treated units, whereas
the figure on the right shows the same analysis for states identified as having moderate degrees
of pressure for diversification. The signed-rank statistic that we calculate is displayed as the
red-dashed line in the figure. One-tailed p-values are listed.
Analysis: Treatment is an Decrease in Actors
Now consider the same analysis but where we define treatment as a decrease in the number
of actors. As Table 3 suggests the sample size here is small as well, but we can conduct the
analysis nonetheless. The p-value we obtain is correct. Again the statistic is far from zero
reflecting the fact that treatment is associated with a decreased time prior to experiencing
the appointment of a woman. Again, the one tailed p-value is suggestive in such a small
sample. But critically, this result is precisely the opposite of what we observed in the first
analysis. Both treatments seem to cause a decrease in the time prior to the appointment of a
woman! These findings are consistent with what we have observed in the broader literature.
They are mixed.
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Figure 11: Shows permutation distributions for the signed-rank statistic associated for sample
of states in which the treated state experienced a decrease in the number of actors involved
in the appointments process. The signed-rank statistic that we calculate is displayed as the
red-dashed line drawn on the permutation distribution for the statistic. One-tailed p-values
are listed.
Interpretation
Our analysis began with a formalization of existing theoretical arguments, which reproduced
the key logics in those approaches and yet expanded those logics in a way that identified
new empirical content. This process also pointed to research design challenges, which we
have addressed in our approach. Although the findings are suggestive, they are far from
compelling; and critically, they suggest support for both arguments. Just as is true in the
existing literature, it would appear that the sample you pick and the analysis you conduct
powerfully influence the result that you obtain in this context. What are we to make of this?
One natural possibility is that the processes we have identified are simply not the right
processes. Setting aside simple measurement error, it really may be that the formal processes
that govern appointment are layered on top of informal processes of appointments that distort
the incentives we see articulated in the literature. In this sense, rules matter but we have
identified the incorrect ones. Another possibility is that there is not enough data in the
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world to generate sufficiently powered tests. Notably our analysis of the decrease in the
number of actors only involved five pairs of states. Another possibility is that the forces
identified by the independent and interdependent choice models operate in different states
at different times. The politics of appointments in two states are subject to different politics
with vastly different incentives. And of course, the rules that we use for appointments,
formal or informal, may simply not matter.
These are all sensible possibilities, albeit each suggests a quite different solution if we
still wish to learn about the role that institutions play in appointments politics. Two salient
alternatives remain. First, it is possible that the forces the models identify operate simulta-
neously. In other words, when you increase the number of actors at play in an appointments
process, one simultaneously creates conditions for more diverse searches for qualified candi-
dates and conditions for coordination failure. If that is true, the any change in any direction
will result is forces being applied in opposing directions, which could plausibly result in null
results under either of the two treatments we consider. But second, it is certainly possible
that neither of these arguments is on the right track. It may be that some other theoretical
process, very much related to the institutions, is at play. Consider the following. Suppose
that we consider states that have not had a woman appointed to their peak courts. It has
only been men. And suppose further that the institutional process for identifying and se-
lecting judges has been stable. It may be that states like this with stable appointment rules
will be quite likely to reproduce the gender distribution of their historical courts, for reasons
associated with the ways that a variety of implicit and explicit biases manifest in hiring
practices. Now suppose that the institutional process is changed, by adding or subtracting
players. It may be that this change, this disruption in historical practice may lead to a
reevaluation of how appointments have been done in the past. And it may be that this
change causes a consideration of candidates that had historically been ignored.
We conduct one final analysis, where treatment is defined as a change in any direction –
an addition or a subtraction of actors. If the theoretical forces we have considered counteract
34
each other, then we should not observe an effect of this treatment. On the other hand, if what
matters is change, then we should see a decrease in the time between institutional change
and the appointment of a woman. The results are extremely clear and highly significant.
In our sample, it would appear that changes in institutional processes, really of any type,
decrease the time prior to the appointment of a woman.
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Figure 12: Shows permutation distributions for the signed-rank statistic associated for sample
of states in which the treatment is defined as any change in the number of appointers or
nominators. The signed-rank statistic that we calculate is displayed as the red-dashed line
drawn on the permutation distribution for the statistic. One-tailed p-values are listed.
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Conclusion
In this project, we set out to determine which of the competing claims in the literature about
judicial selection institutions – having fewer actors involved in selection versus having more
actors involved in selection – accelerated gender diversity on the bench. Replicating the
inconsistent findings in the literature, we found that an increase in the number of actors and
a decrease in the number of actors both had positive but statistically insignificant affects on
the timing of diversification. Instead, we found that any changes to the number of actors
involved in selection was associated with an acceleration in diversification. Importantly,
most of these changes to the judicial selection procedures occur when new constitutions are
adopted, often after conflict. Our finding that women gain a seat on the court faster after
a constitutional change is consistent with literature that suggests post-conflict governance
provides opportunities for women (Hughes, 2009; Dawuni and Kang, 2015).
In addition to the finding that constitutional change has a larger effect on the timing
of gender diversity than the type of change, this project suggests a number of implications
and directions for future research. First, it is possible that the the number of actors and the
incentives involved in selection do affect judicial gender diversification, but that the institu-
tional process is so complicated that casual effects are too noisy to identify. One solution
to this noisiness is good experimentation to generate a controlled environment capable of
revealing the casual effects of specific mechanisms.
Second, it is possible that both existing arguments (increasing or decreasing the number
of selectors) are accurate but one explanation applies to some contexts and the other expla-
nation applies to others. It may be that a public goods provision game captures the politics
of state A well but not of state B. If that is correct, what is needed are country specific
studies rather than cross-national studies where the analyst can come to understand the
basic structure of the particular kind of politics in a state. Inference will still likely require
identifying changes to rules but focusing on a single jurisdiction will mitigate the possibility
of comparing two states that are simply playing different games.
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Finally, it may be the case that constitutional rules are not the important rules for un-
derstanding diversification of the bench. Informal rules and norms may override the formal,
constitutionally-based rules. We know a good deal about the informal appointment processes
about many states, but this information has not been systematized. We believe it should be.
Producing this kind of knowledge requires careful historical work, good interviewing, and –
most likely – fieldwork.
We believe that the continued examination of the processes through which women come
to gain seats on prestigious courts is important. In our future work, we will consider how con-
text – such as conflict, informal processes, and cross-country differences in how institutions
condition outcomes – shape prospects for gender diversity cross-nationally.
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